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CONSENT, COERCION and SHARED 
PARENTING: RUFFUDEEN-COUTTS V 
COUTTS 
 
Susan B. Boyd* 
 
Over the past couple of decades, social and legal norms have 
shifted radically in favour of shared parenting as the preferred 
model for post-separation parenting, whether that be shared 
decision-making or shared time.1 Even in jurisdictions such as 
Canada that have not legislated a preference for shared 
parenting time, shared arrangements and joint custody awards 
have steadily increased. 2  The notion that children may be 
harmed if they do not maintain generous contact with their 
fathers is firmly entrenched, despite ongoing critical analysis of 
the consequences of excessive attention to the need for contact 
relative to other considerations.3 Even in the face of a strong 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*  The author thanks The Honourable Donna Martinson for reading an 
earlier draft, Jennifer Flood (UBC J.D. 2013) for her impeccable 
editing assistance, and an anonymous reviewer for constructive 
suggestions.!
1 Helen Rhoades, “The Rise and Rise of Shared Parenting Laws: A 
Critical Reflection” (2002) 19 Can J Fam L 75.!
2 For example, Canadian statistics for 2003 indicate that in 44 percent 
of court-determined custody cases in the divorce context, the outcome 
is an order for joint custody, which is more than double the number 
from the mid-1990s and four times the figure when compared to the 
late 1980s: Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Gender Based 
Statistical Report, 5th ed (Ottawa: Target Group Project, 2006) at 
103-116. It is reasonable to assume that the percentage of joint 
custody awards have risen since 2003.!
3  The focus tends to be on paternal contact because children still live 
primarily with their mothers after separation or divorce. Because 
Canada has conducted less empirical research on the outcomes of 
custody arrangements, this comment draws mainly on empirical 
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statement from the Ontario Court of Appeal that joint custody 
orders should not be made in contested cases without “some 
evidence before the court that, despite their differences, the 
parents are able to communicate effectively with one another”,4 
joint custody is sometimes ordered in fact scenarios that fly in 
the face of this message.5 In some cases, this result occurred 
because of the ideological convictions of a judge that joint 
custody is superior to sole custody or due to a failure to take 
seriously problematic conduct by one of the parents.6 
 
Despite the apparent embrace of shared parenting 
within the legal system, empirical research cautions against any 
“one size fits all” approach to the wellbeing of children whose 
parents live apart. For instance, Trinder’s review of empirical 
studies on shared parenting time (which does not necessarily 
mean equal time but rather can be as low as 30 percent of time 
with one parent) shows that while shared residence can be a 
positive outcome in a climate of parental cooperation and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
studies in other jurisdictions such as Australia and England. Critical 
voices have, however, been raised in Canada against the normative 
shift toward joint custody and shared parenting. See for example: 
Susan B. Boyd, “Autonomy for Mothers? Relational Theory and 
Parenting Apart” (2010) 18:2 Fem Legal Stud 137; Elizabeth Hughes, 
"The Language and Ideology of Shared Parenting in Family Law 
Reform: A Critical Analysis" (2003) 21 Can Fam LQ 1; Martha 
Shaffer, “Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment 
to Divorce: What the Social Science Literature Does and Does Not 
Tell Us” (2007) 26 Can Fam LQ 286 [Shaffer, “Joint Custody, 
Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment”].!
4  Kaplanis v Kaplanis (2005), 249 DLR (4th) 620, 194 OAC 106 (Ont 
CA) at para 11.!
5  Martha Shaffer, "Joint Custody Since Kaplanis and Ladisa – A 
Review of Recent Ontario Case Law" in Martha Shaffer, ed, 
Contemporary Issues in Family Law (Toronto: Thomson Canada, 
2007) 431 at 459-470 [Shaffer, “Joint Custody Since Kaplanis”].!
6  Ibid.!
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where children’s needs are prioritized, in higher conflict cases, 
which typically follow litigation, negative outcomes for 
children are too often found.7 The research shows that children 
can benefit from regular contact with both parents after 
separation, but only when they cooperate, communicate, and 
have low levels of conflict.8 Moreover, social science research 
does not reveal a clear linear relationship between the amount 
of parenting time and better outcomes for children.9  
 
Given this research, it might be thought that an 
approach that looks to the needs and interests of the individual 
child at the heart of a dispute would be far preferable to a pro-
contact or shared parenting approach. The former approach 
would be far better suited to the task of preventing 
unacceptable risk to children. Instead, shared parenting remains 
rooted as the preferential norm, being the de facto, if not the de 
jure, starting point for decision-making both inside and outside 
the courts. Mothers who raise concerns about contact by the 
other parent are too often vilified as selfishly promoting their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  Liz Trinder, “Shared Residence: A Review of Recent Research 
Evidence” (2010) 22:4 Child & Fam LQ 475. See also Belinda 
Fehlberg et al, “Legislating for Shared Time Parenting After 
Separation: A Research Review” (2011) 25:3 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 
318; Helen Rhoades, “The Dangers of Shared Care Legislation: Why 
Australia Needs (Yet More) Family Law Reform” (2008) 36:3 
Federal L Rev 279; Belinda Fehlberg, Christine Millward, and 
Monica Campo, “Shared Post-Separation Parenting in 2009: An 
Empirical Snapshot” (2009) 23 Austl J Fam L 247; and Shaffer, 
“Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment”, supra 
note 3.!
8  See review of the literature in Fehlberg et al, supra note 7.!
9  Shaffer, “Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children’s 
Adjustment”, supra note 3; Bruce Smyth, “A Five Year Retrospective 
of Post-Separation Shared Care Research in Australia” (2009) 15:1 J 
Fam Stud 36.!
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own interests or, worse, as engaging in conduct that alienates 
the other parent.10 
 
The 2012 decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Ruffudeen-Coutts v Coutts11 suggests that parents who attempt 
to resist custody arrangements that embody the hegemony of 
the pro-contact or pro-shared parenting approach can face an 
uphill battle. It also illustrates the considerable influence that a 
judge can have on negotiated consent orders between parents. 
Parents who are concerned about how they or their children 
will fare under a shared parenting regime may not be “heard” 
within negotiations or court proceedings in the same way as 
those who push for a shared parenting arrangement. Moreover, 
they may be persuaded, or even coerced, to agree to 
arrangements that may not be in their children’s best interests. 
 
RUFFUDEEN-COUTTS V COUTTS 
 
The technical issue in Ruffudeen-Coutts was whether leave to 
appeal was required in the case, given that the order was 
ostensibly a consent order (for joint custody and shared 
primary residence) that normally requires leave to appeal.12 
The father had brought a motion to quash the mother’s appeal 
for lack of leave. The first appellate panel found that leave was 
required because the order was a consent order and dismissed 
the motion to quash because the proper leave materials had not 
been prepared. A new panel of the Court of Appeal was then 
asked to deal with both the leave issue and with the merits of 
the appeal, should leave be granted. Epstein J.A., for the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  Helen Rhoades, “The ‘No Contact Mother’: Reconstructions of 
Motherhood in the Era of the ‘New Father’” (2002) 16 Int’l JL Pol’y 
& Fam 71.!
11  Ruffudeen-Coutts v Coutts, 2012 ONCA 65, 348 DLR (4th) 64 
[Ruffudeen-Coutts].!
12  Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 133(a).!
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majority, found that the mother’s argument that she was under 
duress at the time she entered the agreement that formed the 
foundation of the order was not supported by any affidavit 
evidence.13 Furthermore, the majority confirmed that the order 
was a consent order14 despite the unusual circumstances, which 
are explained below. As such, leave to appeal was required 
before the merits could be considered.  
 
Epstein J.A. noted that jurisprudence reveals resistance 
to allowing a review of issues that the parties have represented 
to the court as having been resolved.15 Where the issue relates 
to the validity of consent, leave should not be granted unless 
the evidence demonstrates that there is an arguable case that, at 
the time the agreement that formed the basis of the consent 
order was entered into, the moving party could not or did not 
consent due to factors such as fraud, duress, or undue 
influence. 16  It was, however, noted that matters involving 
children fall into a special category, given the court’s 
obligation to give priority to the child’s best interests.17 Before 
articulating the test for cases involving children, Epstein J.A. 
made three observations speaking to the desirability of 
upholding consent orders and the high threshold for obtaining 
leave even in cases involving children: 
 
a. In cases involving children, the statutory requirements 
related to best interests of the child mean that the 
judge’s determination should attract deference. 
b. Finality itself has been recognized as being in the best 
interests of the child. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13  Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 11 at para 48.!
14  Ibid at paras 49-56.!
15  Ibid at para 59.!
16  Ibid at para 64.!
17  Ibid at paras 65-66.!
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c. Family law practice and procedure encourages parties 
to come to an agreement on as many issues as possible, 
and therefore, consent orders are regularly granted. 
Allowing them to be easily appealed would provide 
another route to prolonged litigation.18 
 
As a result, Epstein J.A. found that “leave to appeal 
consent orders in family law cases involving children should 
not be granted unless . . . the record demonstrates an arguable 
case that the order, at the time it was made, was not in the 
child(ren)’s best interests.”19 Epstein J.A. could find nothing in 
the record in the case at hand to support the conclusion that the 
judge did not honour his statutory obligations to make a 
determination in the child’s best interests. In fact, she said, “the 
order in this case was for shared custody, which on its face, is 
consistent with the maximum contact principle articulated in s. 
16(10) of the Divorce Act.”20 Like too many judges, Epstein 
J.A. overlooked the precise wording of section 16(10), which is 
that “the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of 
the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as 
is consistent with the best interests of the child.”21 It is entirely 
possible that shared custody was not consistent with this child’s 
best interests, a point to which I return below. 
 
Epstein J.A. went on to look at the law on consent in 
contracts and to find that there was no evidence to support the 
duress argument presented by Ms. Ruffudeen-Coutts. Ms. 
Ruffudeen-Coutts had been represented by counsel and there 
was no evidence that counsel gave ineffective advice or 
assistance, nor evidence from counsel about how, if at all, his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18  Ibid at paras 69-71.!
19  Ibid at para 73.!
20  Ibid at para 74.!
21  Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp), s 16(10) [emphasis added].!
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client was affected by the conduct of the motion judge.22 A 
strong dissent by Feldman J.A. disagreed on the approach to 




The facts in Ruffudeen-Coutts, as presented by Epstein J.A., 
reveal a short marriage of four years (2006-2010), with one 
young child, a two-year-old son, and a history of conflict, at 
least post-separation. The mother applied for divorce along 
with, inter alia, sole custody and only supervised access by the 
father. The father brought a counter-motion in which he sought 
shared custody. Seven days after her application for divorce, 
the mother brought a motion on an urgent basis for a temporary 
order for sole custody and supervised access by the father, 
exclusive possession of the home and a restraining order 
against the father. After negotiations, a temporary agreement 
was reached whereby the son would reside with the mother and 
the father would have supervised access. A restraining order 
was also agreed to. These terms were reflected in a consent 
order dated the same day, December 22, 2010. 
 
The dissenting justice, Feldman J.A., added more 
factual texture. The supervised access that had been agreed to 
was to be by either the father’s brother or the mother’s brother. 
The consent order restrained direct communication between the 
parties, and police assistance was ordered to enforce the order 
and return the child to the mother after access visits.23 The 
mother’s affidavit alleged she was the sole caregiver to her son, 
having taken off 14 months from her job following his birth. 
The mother also alleged that “the father showed little interest in 
caring for the child, was abusive to her including yelling, 
swearing and throwing things at her, and that she feared for her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22  Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 11 at para 76.!
23  Ibid at para 7.!
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safety and that of the child.” 24  The father denied these 
allegations and claimed that the mother was keeping the child 
from him. Clearly there was at least high conflict, and at worst 
possible abuse, at issue in this case. The child had never spent a 
night with the father alone.25 
 
THE MOTION JUDGE 
 
In March 2011, the father brought a motion on an urgent basis 
for a change in access and return of his passport. The mother 
brought a cross-motion for contempt, alleging that the father 
was not cooperating with efforts to sell the home. Once again, 
they negotiated a settlement, dealing with all issues other than 
the father’s access, certain child care expenses and an expert 
assessment requested by the father. These outstanding issues 
came before Hambly J., the motion judge, on May 31, 2011. At 
this hearing, both parents were represented by counsel.  
 
According to Epstein J.A., the mother’s counsel at 
some point asked for time to seek instructions from his client 
with regard to a possible resolution, and after a short break, the 
parties advised that they had reached an agreement. One key 
term was that custody and support of the child would be shared 
and there would be no spousal support. Minutes of Settlement 
were signed and the motion judge indicated that he would grant 
an order accordingly. However, on his own initiative, the 
motion judge wrote reasons “in which he purported to explain 
his willingness to endorse the consent.”26 As well, he suggested 
that three terms be added, for example, providing for 
prohibitions against the parties criticizing each other or 
allowing others to criticize them in front of their son. The final 
order dealt with all unresolved matters and added these three 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24  Ibid at para 8.!
25  Ibid at para 31.!
26  Ibid at para 43.!
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terms characterized by Epstein J.A. as “peripheral to the issues 
of importance to the parties.”27 
 
Referring in some detail to the transcript of the May 
2011 hearing, Feldman J.A. noted that it disclosed “that the 
motion judge made it clear from the beginning that having read 
the record, he was upset with the way the mother had carried 
on the litigation including her allegations against the father and 
her emergency motion.”28 The motion judge observed that the 
mother’s conduct in “exaggerating and making extreme 
unsubstantiated allegations . . . constituted evidence of 
attempting to alienate the father from his child.”29 Even though 
neither party was asking at that time that the primary residence 
of the child be moved from the mother on an interim basis, the 
judge “suggested to the parties at the lunch break that they each 
determine what conditions they would seek if the primary 
residence of the child were changed to be with the father.”30 
Over an extended lunch period, the parties and their counsel 
negotiated. The mother’s counsel requested more time, saying 
they had made some progress. The judge responded by 
clarifying that he was the one to make the order, so any 
resolution was to be only with his approval. When the parties 
came back, they again needed more time, which was resisted 
by the motion judge. He gave them only a “little time” and 
cautioned that he would not approve a police assistance order, 
“which he felt was inappropriate in a child custody context.” 
Feldman J.A. stated that the motion judge “made it clear that he 




28  Ibid at para 10.!
29  Ibid at para 17.!
30  Ibid at para 10.!
31  Ibid at para 14.!
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Feldman J.A. added more detail about the order of the motion 
judge. It was for shared custody, with primary residence being 
one week with the mother, then one week with the father, plus 
12 hours access on the non-residential week. Counsel disagreed 
on whether that was a “final” or a “trial” order, with the 
mother’s counsel thinking he had agreed to an order that would 
be tried out. “The judge said he thought the word written was 
‘final’ and he made it final.”32 He concluded by commending 
the parties for working it out “after listening to me.”33 His 
reasons for judgment, released six days later, indicated that he 
felt that the mother and her counsel had overreached in 
bringing the original emergency motion and that there was no 
evidence to support a supervised access order. The husband 
had earlier consented to this order, approved by another motion 
judge. 
 
In addition, the motion judge struck an affidavit made 
by the mother’s brother, in which he expressed negative views 
about the father’s interactions with the child, from the record. 
Finally, in paragraph 10 of the reasons of the motion judge, he 
stated: “I told counsel . . . that the primary residence of the 
child should be with the father and the issue was whether the 
wife’s involvement with the child should be supervised in a 
manner that would ensure that she did not attempt to alienate 
the child from the father. I also emphasized that the child was 
entitled to the involvement and support of both parents in his 
life as he grew up. After receiving my view, counsel asked for 
time to seek instructions from their clients, which I readily 
gave them.”34 
 
This more detailed account of what went on prior to 
agreement being reached by the parents, presented by Feldman 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32  Ibid at para 15.!
33  Ibid.!
34  Ibid at para 19.!
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J.A., makes more sense of the mother’s key argument: that her 
consent was given under duress due to the comments made by 
the motion judge and, as such, did not amount to consent in 
law. As we have seen, the majority of the Court of Appeal did 




Feldman J.A., in dissent, did not deal with the duress issue 
directly. Instead, she found that part of the order was made on 
consent, while part was not. As such, she found that leave to 
appeal was not required. If, however, she were wrong and the 
order was indeed a consent order requiring leave to appeal, 
then she “would grant leave on the basis that the motion judge 
made an error of law by failing to fully consider the best 
interests of the child, which is always required, including when 
the order is on consent.”35 Feldman J.A. noted that the Court of 
Appeal decision in Kaplanis v Kaplanis36 also involved facts 
where the parties had trouble communicating. In Kaplanis, 
Weiler J.A. found that where parties have trouble 
communicating, there must be some evidence that they will be 
able to effectively communicate before joint custody can be 
ordered.37 Feldman J.A. found that the record in Ruffudeen-
Coutts revealed a motion judge who was so focused on his 
perception that the mother was trying to alienate the child that 
he did not properly consider the best interests of the child, as 
required by the relevant statutes. She stated that “the court’s 
obligation to ensure that the agreement reached was in the best 
interests of the child required at least testing the evidence and 
possibly expert involvement before making a final order.”38 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35  Ibid at para 23.!
36  Kaplanis v Kaplanis (2005), 249 DLR (4th) 620, 194 OAC 106 (Ont 
CA).!
37  Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 11 at para 29.!
38 Ibid at para 34.!
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She would have set aside the final order and ordered a new 




In the end, all justices offered a way for the mother to change 
the ostensibly consensual order for shared time, especially 
given the incomplete evidence in the case. Epstein J.A. 
signaled that she found some comments from the motion judge 
“troubling”,40 and noted that the mother was “not left without 
an opportunity to address her concerns upon a proper record 
and in the appropriate forum.”41 The mother could bring a 
motion to set aside the order on the ground of facts arising or 
discovered after the order was made. Epstein J.A. also stated 
that such a motion, if brought, should be heard by a judge other 
than the motion judge.  
 
The mother eventually found a remedy via this route. 
She successfully applied for an order to set aside the four 
paragraphs of the May 31, 2011 order that had required shared 
custody on alternating weeks. Madam Justice Leitch found that 
“it is very clear on the evidence that the comments of the 
motions judge coerced the settlement” and that he recognized 
that his expression of his views had a significant impact on the 
parties.42 Although Leitch J. felt that the motions judge had 
“offered his candid reflections to help the parties”, in the 
circumstances of the case, “the motions judge did not present 
as a neutral referee who only expressed preliminary 
impressions, views or concerns and the resulting pressure 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39  Ibid at para 35.!
40  Ibid at para 76.!
41  Ibid at para 78.!
42  Ruffudeen-Coutts v Coutts, 2012 ONSC 6438 at para 100 [Ruffudeen-
Coutts 2012].!
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placed on the Applicant was illegitimate and coerced her 
will.”43 In place of the paragraphs that were set aside, Leitch J. 
made a temporary order reflecting what the parties had outlined 
in the original consent endorsement request placed before the 
motions judge on May 31, 2011: primary residence with the 
mother. She also ordered that a case conference be scheduled 
on an urgent basis.44 
 
Ruffudeen-Coutts raises an issue about the extent to 
which judges should convey to high conflict parties before 
them quite directive messages about the desired outcome of the 
dispute. The motion judge in effect did this by suggesting that 
an order changing primary residence to the father was likely 
and by implying that “parents should get along for the sake of 
the child.”45 At best, the motion judge was attempting to get the 
parties to negotiate a settlement, as they had done previously; 
at worst, he was trying to punish the mother by removing 
primary residence from her. In the mother’s mind, this pressure 
from the motion judge would likely have prompted her to 
consider the “compromise” of shared parenting as the only way 
for her to retain some custodial rights and protect her child’s 
interests. The evidence before Leitch J. by the applicant and 
her lawyer was precisely to that effect.46 
 
It is impossible to know whether the motion judge was 
attempting to prompt a resolution that reflected shared 
parenting, but that was the outcome. Whether that outcome 
reflected the child’s best interests is open to question. For one 
thing, “[t]here is no empirical evidence showing a clear linear 
relationship between shared time and improving children’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43  Ibid at para 101.!
44  Ibid at para 109.!
45  Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 11 at para 14.!
46  Ruffudeen-Coutts, supra note 42 at paras 43-63.!
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outcomes.”47 While studies show that “it is good for children to 
maintain continuing and regular contact with both parents 
when they cooperate and communicate and have low levels of 
conflict”,48 it is equally clear that these features are not typical 
of the broader separating population and that they are not likely 
to be present in high conflict separating couples such as the one 
in Ruffudeen-Coutts. Moreover, there is “increasing evidence 
that shared time arrangements present particular risks for 
children when mothers express ongoing ‘safety concerns’, 
where there is high ongoing parental conflict and when 
children are very young—or some combination of these”,49 as 
there was in Ruffudeen-Coutts. It is worth repeating that the 
Divorce Act’s “maximum contact” principle in section 16(10) 
applies only to the extent that contact is consistent with the best 
interests of the child.50 As well, in Ontario, as Shaffer has 
emphasized, joint custody (and presumably shared time as 
well) should not be considered or granted by a court when one 
parent behaves in ways that are contrary to the child’s best 
interests.51  
 
The empirical studies reviewed by Fehlberg et al 
indicate that “the evidence so far does not suggest that 
changing the law to encourage shared time leads more families 
to enter shared time arrangements, let alone ‘workable’ 
arrangements (ie manageable for parents and appropriate for 
children’s needs at different points in their childhood).” 52 
Although Fehlberg et al were mainly concerned with efforts to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47  Fehlberg et al, supra note 7 at 321. See also Shaffer, “Joint Custody, 
Parental Conflict and Children’s Adjustment”, supra note 3.!
48  Ibid at 320.!
49  Ibid at 323.!
50  Divorce Act, supra note 21.!
51  Shaffer, “Joint Custody since Kaplanis”, supra note 5 at 464.!
52  Fehlberg et al, supra note 7 at 319.!
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legislate preferences for shared parenting, this cautionary note 
should be considered by judges as well, given the power that 
they can have over parties and their negotiated settlements. 
Even if the evidence were not clear in Ruffudeen-Coutts that 
duress had influenced the negotiation of the consent order, it 
seems fairly evident that influence was brought to bear on the 
negotiations and that the resulting order may not have placed 
the best interests of the child first.  
 
The desirability of encouraging consent orders and 
finality of proceedings must surely be secondary to the need to 
ensure that children’s needs and interests are protected. The 
reasons why some parents find it difficult to come to settlement 
are complex and researchers in England have concluded as 
follows: 
 
Acknowledging and dealing with the ethical and 
emotional conflicts between parents, rather than 
insisting that they are ignored for the sake of the 
children, might actually produce a system that 
will be more attentive to the long-term welfare 
of children.53 
 
These words of caution should be borne in mind in 
light of the recent report presented to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, urging that judges (as well as lawyers and law schools) 
should embrace a culture of mediation and settlement that 
would encourage litigants toward an early negotiated 
settlement.54 While no-one would wish to see parents litigate 
issues that need not be adjudicated, it would also be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53  Carol Smart & Vanessa May, “Why Can’t They Agree? The 
Underlying Complexity of Contact and Residence Disputes” (2004) 
26:4 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 347 at 358.!
54  Kirk Makin, “Report to Supreme Court chief justice calls for family 
law overhaul”, The Globe and Mail, March 27, 2013, online: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com>!
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problematic to see judges err on the other end of the 
continuum, creating a climate of fear or coercion surrounding 
dispute resolution, as appears to have been the case in 
Ruffudeen-Coutts. 
